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IV.

INTRODUCTION

This Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, Lynda Wood ("Ms. Wood"),
responds to issues raised in the Reply Brief of Cross-Appellee,
Neil R. Mitchell ("Mr. Mitchell"") to the Cross-Appeal.
The facts relevant to this Reply Brief are set forth in
Section VIII of the Cross-Appeal in Ms. Wood's Brief of Appellee
and are incorporated herein by this reference.

V
A.

ARGUMENT

MARJORIE WAS ENTITLED TO THE PROCEEDS OF HER LATE HUSBAND'S
PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
The trial court incorrectly concluded that Marjorie Sims

("Marjorie") was not entitled to the settlement of Grant Sims'
("Grant") personal injury suit.

Under U.C.A. § 78-ll-12(b),

Marjorie, as Grant's personal representative and only intestate
heir, was entitled to reimbursement

for expenses she incurred

caring for Grant as a result of his injury.

However, the trial

court assumed against evidence to the contrary that Grant paid his
own medical

expenses.

Since Marjorie

actually

paid nearly

$19,000.00 for Grant's and her combined medical expenses, while
his records show that he paid little over $100.00, the $12,445.86
settlement of his personal injury suit was rightfully Marjorie's.
4

The personal injury survival statute states,
If prior to judgment or settlement the injured
person dies as a result of a cause other than
the injury received as a result of a wrongful
act or negligence of the wrongdoer, the
personal representative or heirs of that
person are entitled to receive no more than
the out-of-pocket expenses incurred by or on
behalf of that injured person as the result of
his injury.
(U.C.A. § 78-ll-12(b)) (emphasis added)
The statute has never been interpreted or explained by Utah
appellate courts.

The trial court's interpretation, however, was

in error as it seemed to rest on the incorrect assumption that
Grant paid his own medical expenses.

Therefore, it falls on this

Court to render an explanation of this statute which is consistent
with decided Utah Supreme Court cases interpreting a similarly
worded statute in a wrongful death action.
The court below explained that the settlement in Grant's suit
was received after the death of Mr. Sims, it
was for actual expenses incurred by Mr. Sims
as a result of the personal injury, and
pursuant to statute is required to be paid
over to the personal representative of the
deceased's (Mr. Sims') Estate . . . . [T]he
funds were properly paid over to Mrs. Sims in
her capacity as personal representative, and
should have been deposited in the accounts of
the Estate, the funds representing expenses
incurred personally by Mr. Sims as a result of
the personal injury case.
(emphasis added)

5

In this statement, the trial court made several errors of
fact and law. First, the court incorrectly stated that Grant paid
his own medical expenses resulting from the personal injury.
However, this is unsupported by any evidence. On the contrary, the
evidence proved Marjorie paid nearly all Grant's medical expenses.
The final accounting of Grant's Estate shows he only paid $112.30
in medical bills from the time of his injury, approximately one
year before his death.

(R.461).

Marjorie's Estate, on the other

hand, expended $18,943.30 from 1990 - 1991 on medical bills,
attributed by the accounting to either Grant or "Both", that is,
between Marjorie and Grant.

(R. 462).

Marjorie's pocket, not

Grant's, bore the greater loss from the medical expenses resulting
from Grant's personal injury.

Thus, under the trial court's

reasoning, the settlement should provide for the expenses paid by
Marjorie, not by Grant.
Second, the court was also incorrect in its interpretation of
the law.

As the statute indicates, the judgment or settlement

should go to the personal representative to cover out-of-pocket
expenses incurred on behalf of the injured person.

The statutes

only limitations restrict (a) the judgment or settlement to the
personal representative or heir, (b) the amount to out-of-pocket
expenses resulting from the injury, and (c) the expenses to those
incurred either by the injured party or on behalf of the injured
party. The statute does not require that the settlement be turned
6

over to the decedent's estate.
This would be a fair and logical conclusion if the decedent
had incurred the expenses and thus stood to be reimbursed.

The

statute on its face gives the right to collect out-of-pocket
expenses to the party who has incurred the debt.
personal

representative

and

only

interested

Thus, where the
heir, Marjorie,

incurred the expenses out of her own pocket on the decedent's
behalf, the fair and logical conclusion is that the settlement
should reimburse the personal representative.
Mr. Mitchell has argued the amount should be put in Grant' s
Estate and then disbursed to the heirs.

However, this would not

reimburse Marjorie' s Estate for her expenditures and financial
loss, not to mention her personal loss.

Instead, the settlement

would ultimately go to Mr. Mitchell, his mother Elna Mitchell, and
Ms. Wood, none of whom bore any expense from Grant' s injury.
Marjorie, on the other hand, would still be limited to money from
Grant' s Estate for her health, support and maintenance; she would
not have been able to seek reimbursement for Grant' s medical
expenses from his Estate without raising another claim. Thus, the
settlement should be awarded to Marjorie' s Estate in compliance
with the statute.
Third, the Cross-Appellee

in his Reply Brief

to Cross-

Appellant's memorandum states that the relevant statute, U.C.A. §
78-11-12, provides that the proceeds of a settlement would go to
7

the personal representative of decedent's estate if he died with a
valid will or to an intestate heir if he did not die with a valid
will.

This interpretation is not necessarily true.

A personal

representative is appointed under Utah law regardless of whether
there was a valid will at death. See U.C.A. § 75-3-301(4). Thus,
the existence or non-existence of a valid will as Cross-Appellee
argues does not explain the use of "the personal representative or
heirs" by the legislature.
The interpretation of the above personal injury survival
statute has not been interpreted by Utah courts.

Therefore, the

Court should look to the interpretation of a similar statute
concerning wrongful death actions, In re Behm's Estater 213 P.2d
657 (Utah 1950).

In that case, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted

the wrongful death statute, §104-3-111 U.C.A. (1943), which uses
the same words "his heirs or his personal representatives" as the
recipient of the proceeds as in the personal injury survival
statute

now

before

the

Court.

The

court

considered

the

reimbursement of a husband from his late wife's estate for expenses
related to her illness and burial.

The court remarked, " [t]o

distribute the fund in proportion to the losses suffered makes the
allocation more consonant with the underlying theory of damages. .
. . To reduce [the surviving husband's] interest in recovery below
the amount he so expended would deny him the right to recover the
sum he was legally required to pay as a result of the wrongdoer's
8

negligence"

Id. at 661-62.

Thus, the court concluded, "The

wording of this section compels a conclusion that the legislature
intended that the proceeds obtained from the wrongdoer would not be
intermingled with other assets of the estate of the deceased."

Id.

at 660.
While Behm and it' s reasoning pertain to a wrongful death
situation, the language of the statute and its rationale are the
same for a personal injury. The Court should recognize the statute
is intended only to reimburse the estate of the deceased where the
deceased incurred the medical expenses relating to his injury, but
that the personal representative should be reimbursed where she
incurred the expenses on the deceased's behalf.
Accordingly, the Court should overturn the lower court's
holding in this matter and award Mar jorie's Estate $12,445.86 from
the settlement of Grant's personal injury suit in her capacity as
personal representative of Grant' s Estate. Marjorie is entitled to
the settlement as reimbursement for the expenses she incurred
providing for her husband's medical care and she would have a claim
against Cross-Appellee's estate for the same amount if the Court
were to deny Cross-Appellant's claim.

9

B.

APPELLANTS SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED INTEREST ON THE CASH
DEFICIENCY OF $48,100.00 AS APPELLEE OFFERED THE AMOUNT IN
SETTLEMENT PRIOR TO THIS CLAIM AND APPELLANT REFUSED THE OFFER
The trial court erred in awarding interest on the $48,100.00

Cash Deficiency to Mr. Mitchell because Ms. Wood offered to repay
that amount to Mr. Mitchell prior to this claim and several times
since

and

Mr. Mitchell

has consistently

refused

her offer.

Further, the award of interest was not a part of the trial court' s
original decision but was added for the first time in the Order.
Therefore, in fairness to Ms. Wood for her good faith offers, and
consistency with the trial court' s Order, the Court should withdraw
the award of interest and limit the award to the $48,100.00 Cash
Deficiency.
Since Ms. Wood offered to repay the cash deficiency almost as
soon as it was requested, it would be unfair for Cross-Appellee to
expect an award of interest simply for rejecting the offer.
According

to

the

Utah

Supreme

Courts

principle

that rules

regarding damages on conversion "can be modified in the interest of
fairness, Winters v. Charles Anthony Jewelers, 586 P.2d 453, 454
(1978), this Court should eliminate the award of interest.
Additionally, the trial court did not award interest on the
Cash Deficiency in its Memorandum Decision, nor does it appear the
court intended to award interest on this amount.

The addition of

interest was added for the first time in the Order itself.
10

In a

personal memo by Judge Hanson (Appendix "A"), which was not sent to
either party, the Judge explained, "Marjorie Sims' Estate agrees
that $48,100 should come back to the George Sims Estate, but
without interest, inasmuch as they offered that amount as soon as
it was requested, and that is probably legitimate. . . .

I ought

to grant Summary Judgment to the George Sims Estate, the claimant,
against the Marjorie Sims Estate for the $48,100 without interest
. . ."

(R. 517-18) (emphasis added).

In the Memorandum Decision,

all the trial court awarded was "the $48,100 which the personal
representative of Marjorie Sims Estate has offered to return
heretofore.n

(R. 512).

Despite this decision, the Orders for

Motions on Summary Judgment directed Marjorie' s Estate to pay
$48,100.00 with interest added at 10% per annum.

(R. 521 ).

Further, a tender of the converted property prior to the
commencement of the action will serve to reduce the damages of the
claimant.

Colby v. Reed. 99 U.S. 560, L.Ed. 484 (1879).

matters were argued to the trial court in final argument.

These
(R.

563). Despite all these facts, the Order drafted by Mr. Mitchell,s
attorneys and signed by the trial court awarded interest on this
amount. The Cross-Appellant takes the position that the imposition
of interest on the Cash Deficiency was error where the CrossAppellant offered to return the same amount prior to the claim
being made and the Appellant refused that offer and where the trial
judge appeared to have decided against the imposition of interest.
11

VI.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED

Lynda Wood respectfully requests this Court find in her favor
and reverse the trial court's ruling on the Personal Injury
Settlement

and

Deficiency.

on

the

imposition

of

interest

on

the

Cash

Since the personal injury survival statute seeks to

reimburse the party damaged by the decedent1 s injury, and it was
Marjorie who was so damaged, financially as well as personally, the
settlement

should

reimbursement.

be

awarded

to

Marjorie

Sims'

Estate

in

Also, the imposition of interest on the Cash

Deficiency should be withdrawn as it is unfair to

Marjorie' s

Estate which offered to return the Cash Deficiency though Mr.
Mitchell rejected the offer, and contrary to the trial court' s
express intent in it' s memo and Order.

DATED this

-< /

day of January, 1996

JOHN L. McCOY
(2164)
Attorney tor Lynda Wood-Appellant
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"APPENDIX A"

MEMO
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TO:

Pile

FROM:

Judge Hanson

DATE:

January 18, 1995
In the Matter of the Estat<

RE:

Case No.

933900278

There are reciprocal Motions for Summary Judgment in this
matter, wherein the Estate of George Sims has made a claim against
the Estate of Marjorie Sims, which is the matter before the Court.
George Sims' Estate, through its successor personal representative,
claims that Marjorie Sims, before she died, diverted sums out of
the George Sims Estate that should be paid back. The substance of
the claim is that she failed to set up and fund a trust that was
provided for in the George Sims Will.

There is really no dispute

that she failed to set up the trust with the funds from the George
Sims Estate, but rather she used them for her own purposes.
The Estate of Marjorie Sims argues that while there has been
a technical breach, there is no damage as required by the statute,
and so I need to look at the statute that authorizes these types of
claims.

The Marjorie Sims Estate, represented by attorney McCoy,

says there is no damage because she was entitled to the funds in
any event.

0ftft£ i a

-2-

It is clear that she was entitled to the interest.

It is not

so clear that she was entitled to an invasion of the principal.
There are apparently two lines of cases:

Wyoming, Montana, Kansas

line and a Colorado line, that talk about whether or not the
language necessary is limited to the invasion of principal when the
funds of the beneficiary (in this case, Mrs. Sims, while she was
alive), are able to take care of her own needs.
It seems that the better cases are that she would have got the
principal in any event, therefore, no damages.
Marjorie Sims' Estate agrees that $48,100 should come back to
the George Sims Estate, but without interest, inasmuch as they
offered that as soon as it was requested, and that is probably
legitimate.

The remaining portions of the $48,100 up to the

$52,000 claimed

(and see the chart in this regard), are either

interest or principal, I'm unable to tell, but if she would have
got them either as interest or principal then, of course, there is
no damage.
The $12,000 for the personal injury claim is not a matter that
Mrs. Sims was entitled to, but rather was part of the Estate, and
so it would appear that would have to come back.

This is not like

a wrongful death claim where she is the heir of the wrongful death
claim, but rather the Estate is the recipient of his personal
injury claim, so the $12,000 should come back to the Estate; the

0 0ftq; 1 ^

-3-

$41,800 they agreed to; the rest, if I accept McCoy's argument, are
matters that she would have been entitled to in any event, and
therefore there is no damage.
It looks like Summary Judgment ought to be granted both ways
in some respects. On McCoy's claim, the $96,000-plus in accordance
with the chart, whether it is interest or principal of the George
Sims Estate, and the trust if it would have been set up, would have
gone to her in any event for reasonable and necessary
expenses,

regardless

of

the

amount

of

income

that

living

she

had.

Everything beyond the $48,100 in the second category of $52,000
would be either principal or interest that she would have been
entitled to, therefore that doesn't constitute a damage, and so I
should grant Summary Judgment to the Marjorie Sims Estate on that
issue.
On the other hand, I ought to grant Summary Judgment to the
George Sims Estate, the claimant, against the Marjorie Sims Estate
for the $48,100 without

interest, and then the amount of the

personal injury claim - $12,000-plus, because that was part of the
George Sims Estate and not something she should have taken as
personal representative before she died.
The personal injury amount

($12,000-plus) so also include

interest from the date that it was received.

So there will be

Summary Judgment in favor of Wilson's client against the Marjorie
Sims Estate in that amount.

